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Game theory and 
the surgeon
How the controversial study of strategic 
decision-making plays out in our profession. 
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The first thing that people think when they hear the term ‘game theory’ is most likely to be ‘What is it?’, followed by 
‘Why should I care?’. Game theory is a way 
of analysing the choices we make when we 
interact with others and how their choices 
affect ours. If you interact with anyone, you 
are playing a game.
Take the following instance. You and your 
partner are deciding where to go for dinner 
and you think that your vegetarian partner 
is likely to choose the vegan Dendrophilia’s 
Delights. However, your partner is flexible 
and, as you are a committed carnivore, you 
suggest Bob’s Burger Barn (even though you 
would prefer Steve’s Steakhouse) because 
Bob’s has that black-bean burger for your 
partner and you can get the BBQ Bacon 
Deluxe Burger. You have just played a game 
where you tried to optimise the outcome for 
the two of you (cooperative behavior), in-
stead of insisting on the big win for yourself.
We will discuss four scenarios where 
game theory applies to surgeons on a 
personal level, a hospital/clinic level, in the 
regional market, and in interactions with 
the public. These scenarios illustrate the 
prisoner’s dilemma game, the tragedy of the 
commons, motivation for cheating in a cartel, 
and the effect of asymmetric knowledge in 
surgical markets.
Let’s look at a common situation in 
operating theatres. A surgeon wants to add a 
patient to the schedule but there isn’t enough 
time left for his case. He wants the team to 
agree to post the case but the team may not 
agree. This is a classic example of what is 
known as the prisoner’s dilemma game (PG). 
In the classic PG, two prisoners are arrested 
for a petty crime, but suspected of a much 
more serious one. They know that the police 
only have evidence of the minor crime and 
that they face only a short time in jail if con-
victed (assuming they both cooperate and 
keep silent). However, if one of them testifies 
against the other (defects), that one will get 
a much lighter sentence and the other will 
get a heavy sentence. Knowing this, each 
prisoner weighs up his options and thinks 
that his best solution is to defect and testify, 
resulting in both prisoners ending up with 
worse outcomes than had they cooperated by 
remaining silent.
In the operating theatre setting, the 
surgeon may ‘defect’ by misleading the 
team about the time needed, or complain to 
hospital management to pressure the team. 
Or, the operating theatre team can simply say 
‘no’, instead of looking for ways to accom-
modate the surgeon. If both the surgeon and 
the team defect, the patient gets delayed 
and neither side is happy. If there was more 
cooperation from both sides, they may have 
been able to work out an arrangement that 
would benefit all concerned. In real life, we 
find that people tend not to act as rationally 
as required in the mathematical analysis of 
game theory, partly because we value social 
interactions and the benefit to others.1,2
On a broader scale, a surgeon might ask 
for an additional assistant for his or her clinic. 
Should the clinic manager provide the extra 
staff or not? Ultimately, the resources are fi-
nite and need to be allocated in some rational 
way. Even if the costs of that extra staff are 
somehow charged back to the surgeon, it is a 
small cost relative to the gain if that surgeon 
sees more patients. However, each additional 
request for help or extra equipment erodes 
the financial status of the clinic and makes it 
less able to engage in strategic investments. As 
the profit margin goes down, the return on 
investment to parent corporation becomes so 
small that the clinic is closed. In game theory, 
this is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’. 
When sheep-herders add one more to their 
flock grazing on the commons, there is an 
incremental benefit – another fattened sheep 
or a bit more wool to sell – for that individual. 
However, the commons is degraded a bit by 
the additional grazing. As more families add 
that extra sheep, the commons is degraded 
more and more until nothing is left. Although 
the individuals initially benefit by getting that 
extra bit from the commons, overuse eventu-
ally leads to the downfall of all.
In many markets there may be two or 
more hospitals or health systems that are 
competing for patients in a specific service 
line. There is a finite market for those 
services and the costs of providing care are 
similar if the facilities are of a similar age, 
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have similar supply costs, and have similar 
labour costs. They could have an agreement 
to evenly split the market (ignoring the legal 
aspects of collusion). In Figure 1 we see the 
market demand for services and the average 
total cost at various levels of demand. The 
optimal production is where the curve for 
marginal revenue intersects the curve for 
marginal cost of production. If the two hos-
pitals were to collude and agree to split the 
market share at this level of production, they 
would maximise the profit of the system.
But what if one hospital were to cheat 
and cut its price a bit to attract a few more 
patients? It would make a bit less on average, 
but still increase its total revenue. The 
other hospital would try to do the same 
and revenue per case would continue to go 
down until there was no margin left. As 
multiple providers enter the marketplace (eg 
the growth of ambulatory surgery centres), 
the likelihood of cheating increases because 
‘in small groups reputation balances the 
urge to cheat but, as players become more 
numerous, reputation is less important and 
the prospective gain from cheating becomes 
larger’.3,4 Cheating can drive the market 
price down to where there is no margin left 
for anyone.
Another aspect of game theory that 
applies to surgeons is the role of asymmetric 
information and its effect on quality. This is 
particularly relevant to discretionary surgi-
cal procedures such as vision correction and 
aesthetic procedures. Pricing to achieve the 
desired volume and market share involves 
game theory, as your choices depend on 
the choices of others and how they respond. 
Top-notch surgeons might be willing to 
perform a procedure for $12,000, whereas 
a so-so surgeon would be willing to take 
$6,000. If consumers can’t tell the difference 
between the high- and low-quality surgeons, 
they might seek each out in roughly equal 
numbers, leading to an average market price 
of $9,000. However, at that price, the high-
er-quality surgeons are less likely to offer the 
procedure, so there will be more lower-quali-
ty surgeons in the market.
Suppose that at the price point of $9,000, 
three-quarters of the procedures were offered 
by the lower-quality surgeons and one 
quarter by the high-quality ones. If the public 
eventually figures this out, they might only 
be willing to pay $7,500 for the procedure 
(the weighted average of the $12,000 and 
$6,000). But at that price, even fewer of the 
top-quality surgeons would be willing to offer 
the procedure, decreasing both the number 
of providers offering the procedure and the 
fraction of high-quality providers willing 
to offer it. The trend is for lower-quality 
products to force out high-quality ones in a 
market where there is asymmetric informa-
tion. Only if consumers have information on 
quality can they make the informed decision 
on pricing and value. Unfortunately, many of 
the publicly reported quality measures fail to 
portray true clinical quality (in part because 
of the lack of risk-adjustment) so price-setting 
for these discretionary procedures involves 
both game theory and wild guesses as to 
public reaction to available information.
Game theory plays an integral part in 
our actions on a day-to-day basis. By under-
standing some of the basic principles, we can 
guide our actions to optimise our outcomes 
on many levels. This can have an impact 
on our relationship with our partners, our 
coworkers, employers, and the general public.
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